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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
CoNsTiTunIoNAJ LAW-DuE PROCESS-WHETHER SEGREGATION ORDINANCE WHICH PoiHnrr PERSONS OF DIFFERENT RACES OR COLOR FROM

case of City of
Birmingham v. Monk,1 recently decided by the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, presented for adjudication a question concerning the constitutionality of a segregation zoning ordinance adopted by the municipality
there concerned. The action was one to secure a declaratory judgment of
LIVING IN THE SAME LocAIATY ARE CONSTITUTIONA--The

1 185 F. (2d) 859 (1951).
Russell, J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
stood that certiorari has been denied.

It is under-
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invalidity on the ground the ordinance, one making it unlawful for any
person of either the white or negro race to establish a residence in an
area zoned for members of the other race, violated rights guaranteed to
the plaintiffs by the Fourteenth Amendment and by certain civil rights
legislation. 2 Plaintiffs were Negroes who had purchased residential property within the city but which was located in a section where occupation
was limited, by the ordinance, to members of the white race. The district
court declared the ordinance to be void and enjoined enforcement thereof
on the principle that the provision was not a legitimate exercise of the
police power. The defendant municipality appealed asserting error in the
exclusion of evidence tending to show breach of the peace, riots, and
destruction of property and life which neither it nor other law enforcement officers could prevent. Such evidence had been offered to justify the
enactment as being no more than a reasonable exercise of the police power.
The majority of the higher court, voting to affirm the decree, stated that
no state or municipality could exercise its police power in such a way as
to bring it into direct conflict with the federal constitution, hence the
ordinance could not possibly be valid. The dissenting judge, willing to
treat the evidence as being admissible for its possible bearing on the issue
of whether or not the particular ordinance was unconstitutional, pointed
to the fact that other constitutional rights have been restricted when the
circumstance required it, confirming his argument by quoting Justice
Holmes' celebrated remark that the "most stringent protection of free
speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and
causing a panic. "3

A query as to the constitutionality of segregation zoning ordinances
has served as the threshold of inquiry before many courts, but while the
problem is not a new one, the decisions have been at variance with each
other. The case of In re Lee Sing4 represents one of the earliest tests of
enactments of the kind in question. It concerned the so-called "Bingham"
ordinance passed by the City of San Francisco, an ordinance which
required all Chinese inhabitants to move from a portion of the city previously occupied by them to a point outside the city and county. The court,
declaring the ordinance to be violative of the Fourteenth Amendment,
pointed out that the obvious purpose was to drive away all citizens of
Chinese ancestry without being aimed at any particular vice or unwholesome or immoral practice so was not designed to effectuate any legitimate
28 U. S. C. A. §§ 41-2.
3 Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 at 52, 39 S. Ct. 247, 63 L. Ed. 470 at 473
(1919).
443 F. 359 (1890). The court intimated that if there had been evidence of
existing vice and other unwholesome practices the ordinance might have been

sustained.
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police power of the city. So bald an affront to civil rights could hardly be
expected to stand.
A nisi prius decision rendered in Virginia in 1913, however, reached
a directly opposite conclusion for it was there found that an ordinance
which prohibited persons of the white and colored races from living in
the same locality was a valid and proper exercise of the police power
because intended to preserve peace and good order. 5 To reach that result,
the court took judicial notice of the fact that close association on the part
of the persons designated had resulted, or tended to result, in breach of the
peace, immorality and danger to the health of the community.6 Judicial
notice there served as the foundation for a showing of a reasonable relation
between the segregation ordinance and the exercise of the police power.
It could be considered analogous to the proof which the dissenting judge
was willing to admit in the instant case.
A later Virginia case, that of Hopkins v. City of Richmond,7 followed
the pattern laid down when it upheld another segregation ordinance. At
that time it said: "Whether a particular ordinance is unreasonable, and
therefore void, is a question for the court, but in determining it the court
will have regard to all the circumstances of the city and the objects sought
to be attained, and the necessity which exists for the ordinance."s To that
point, then, it would seem as if evidence tending to disclose a vital need
for the segregation plan in a given community woud lead to the conclusion
that the particular regulation might be held valid.
Other segregation ordinances have failed to stand the test but for
other reasons. The one concerned in State of Maryland v. Gurry9 was
declared void because it was said to be unreasonable in the light of the
general welfare clause of the city charter. There was indication, however,
that but for such welfare clause the ordinance would have been sustained
for the court adverted to the friction which had developed from occupancy
by colored persons of houses in areas previously occupied entirely by white
people and the reasonableness of seeking to prevent conflict if that was
possible. The court also pointed to the fact that the Fourteenth Amendment, while broad and comprehensive, was not designed to interfere with
a proper exercise of the police power.
In much the same way, the ordinance involved in the North Carolina
Ashland v. Coleman, 19 Va. L. Reg. 427 (1913).
6 Accord: Hopkins v. City of Richmond, 117 Va. 692, 86 S. E. 139 (1915) ; Harden
v. City of Atlanta, 147 Ga. 248, 93 S. E. 401 (1917).
7 117 Va. 692, 86 S. E. 139 (1915). Keith, J., dissented.
8 117 Va. 692 at 708-9, 86 S. E. 139 at 144.
9 121 Md. 534, 88 A. 546, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1087 (1913).
5
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case of State v. Darnell'o was declared void for violation of the general
welfare clause of the city charter, making it unnecessary for the court to
go deeper into the constitutional issues. It did say, however, that as such
an ordinance would tend to forbid an owner of property from selling or
leasing to whomsoever he might see fit there might be occasion to find
constitutional objection to an ordinance which took away "one of the
inalienable rights incident to the ownership of property.""
The earlier Georgia cases appear to have gone deeper into the constitutional issues concerned, but again the inquiry was not directed to the
exercise of the police power. In Carey v. City of Atlanta1 2 the ordinance
was stricken down because it would have operated to deprive one who
was already the owner of property of the right to reside therein, which
deprivation would, in substance, amount to an unjustified taking of the
property itself. Upon repassage of the ordinance with a clause expressly
excluding from its operation those persons who had acquired vested
rights, the ordinance was held valid, in Harden v. City of Atlanta,13 over
the dissent of the judge who had written the earlier opinion but who this
time objected that the new ordinance was objectionable because it was
opposed to a basic principle in denying one the right to acquire a home
of his choice simply on the basis of his race or color.
The death blow to ordinances of this character seemed to fall with
the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Buchanan
v. Warley,14 a suit brought by a white person, as seller, to compel specific
performance of a real estate contract relating to land in Louisville, Kentucky. The defendant, a Negro purchaser, resisted suit on the ground that
a local ordinance would have made it unlawful for him to occupy the
premises. The United States Supreme Court expressed the question to be
one as to whether or not occupancy, and necessarily the purchase and sale
of property of which occupancy was but an incident, could be inhibited
by a state or one of its municipalities solely because of the color of the
proposed occupant. 15 It answered that question with an emphatic declaration that the Fourteenth Amendment was specifically designed to assure
10166 N. C. 300, 81 S. E. 338, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 332 (1914).
11 166 N. C. 300 at 302, 81 S. E. 338 at 339.
12 143 Ga. 192, 84 S. D. 456, L. R. A. 1915D 684, Ann. Case. 1916E 1151 (1915).
13 147 Ga. 248, 93 S. E. 401 (1917). Atkinson, J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
14 245 U. S. 60, 38 S. Ct. 16, 62 L. Ed. 149, L. R. A. 1918C 210, Ann. Cas. 1918A
1201 (1917), reversing Harris v. City of Louisville, 165 Ky. 559, 177 S. W. 472,
Ann. Cas. 1917B 149 (1915).
15 245 U. S. 60 at 75, 38 S. Ct. 16, 62 L. Ed. 149 at 161. The preamble of the
ordinance recited that the purpose was "to prevent conflict and ill-feeling between
the white and colored races" and to "preserve the public peace and promote the
general welfare by making reasonable provisions requiring as far as practicable
the use of separate blocks for residences . . .by white and colored people respectively."
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equal right to all, regardless of color, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold
and convey real and personal property, and that any municipal ordinance
which purported to place restriction thereon was void. 16 On the authority
of that decision, all subsequent cases have usually produced a summary
declaration of invalidity as to those segregation ordinances which have
17
been brought into question.
The decision in the Buchanan case as well as those holdings which
follow it have not gone without criticism' s particularly as to the true
point of conflict between certain of the city councils and the Supreme
Court. The issue would not, as the court says, seem to be "solely" one of
restriction based on color or race but would rather involve the larger
question of segregation versus police power. The former would attempt
to justify the separation of the races by showing the incidence of riots and
breaches of the peace which can, and often does, flow from close association. 19 The latter, more recently concerned with individual rather than
public rights, has tended to jump over the crux of the problem without
full examination thereof and to adjudge this and other forms of segregation on the basis that all are ipso fwcto unconstitutional. If the real test
of all zoning, racial or otherwise, is the proper preservation of that public
welfare which is intimately involved, there should be some conscious
examination into that point before proceeding to pass on other constitutional issues. Granted that no ordinance should stand if its sole purpose is
to discriminate, there is still occasion to give some heed to other aspects
of state power.
J. L.

MORRIS

16 Following that decision, the Atlanta ordinance which had been reviewed in
Harden v. City of Atlanta, 147 Ga. 248, 93 S. E. 401 (1917), was again tested in
Glover v. City of Atlanta, 148 Ga. 285, 96 S. E. 562 (1918), and this time was
declared Invalid. On similar reasoning, an ordinance of the type upheld in Hopkins
v. City of Richmond, 117 Va. 692, 86 S. E. 139 (1915), was rejected in Irvine v.
City of Clifton Forge, 124 Va. 781, 97 S. E. 310 (1918).
17 City of Richmond v. Deans, 281 U. S. 704, 50 S. Ct. 407, 74 L. Ed. 1128 (1930),
affirming 37 F. (2d) 712 (1930) ; Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U. S. 668, 47 S. Ct. 471,
71 L. Ed. 831 (1927), reversing 158 La. 439, 104 So. 200 (1925) ; Bowen v. City of
Atlanta, 159 Ga. 145, 125 S. E. 199 (1924) ; Jackson v. State, 132 Md. 311, 103 A.
910 (1918); Clinard v. City of Winston-Salem, 217 N. C. 119, 6 S. E. (2d) 867,
126 A. L. R. 634 (1940) ; Allen v. Oklahoma City, 175 Okla. 421, 52 P. (2d) 1054
(1936) ; City of Dallas v. Library Annex Corp., 295 S. W. 591 (Tex. Comm. App.,
1927).
18 Martin, "Segregation of Residences of Negroes," 32 Mich. L. Rev. 721-42 (1933),
and notes in 29 Ky. L. J. 213, 16 Mich. L. Rev. 109, 35 Mich. L. Rev. 137.
19 A recent Associated Press dispatch reports the destruction by fire of two houses
in Birmingham, Alabama, which had been bombed during a racial zoning dispute
arising when Negroes began moving into an area formerly zoned for white occupancy: Chicago Tribune, Vol. CX, No. 109,. Part 4, p. 1, May 7, 1951. The story
does not reveal whether the premises concerned are the same as the ones involved
in the instant case.
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CONTRACTS-REQUISITES AND VALIDITY-WHETHER OR NOT A BANK MAY,
BY AGREEMENT WITH ITS CUSTOMER, COMPLETELY EXONERATE ITSELF FROM
LIABILITY FOR ITS NEGLIGENCE IN MAINTAINING A NIGHT DEPOSITORY-While
reviewing courts in this country have frequently been presented with the
question of the validity of bailment contracts which purport to limit the liability of a bailee for his negligence, definitiveness hardly characterizes the
result of decisions thus far attained. Taken together, however, the cases do
indicate an apparent trend, one exemplified by the recent Ohio case of Kolt
v. Cleveland Trust Company.' The defendant there, a bank which provided
night depository facilities to its customers, entered into a written agreement with the plaintiff permitting him to use its facilities for the payment
of a fee. The contract provided that the use of the depository by the
plaintiff was to be at his sole risk and stipulated that the relationship of
debtor and creditor should not arise out of such use. The plaintiff brought
action to recover for a deposit allegedly made by him but receipt of which
was denied by the defendant. At the time of submitting the case to the
jury, the lower court instructed that if the plaintiff had shown, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that he had placed the money in question
in the night depository, it was then incumbent upon the defendant bank
to show that it had exercised ordinary care over the custody of the money
and also directed the jury to ignore any provision in the contract to the
contrary. The Ohio Court of Appeals, on appeal from a verdict and judgment against the bank, after determining that the relationship between the
parties was one of bailor and bailee, held the instruction to be erroneous
on the ground that the bank was absolved from liability by the terms of
the agreement and that the public policy of the state was not opposed to
enforcing such a provision under the circumstances before it.
Although it would appear that no reviewing court in this country has
ever been called upon to consider the point of law concerned as it relates
to the specific facts of the case, 2 the question of the ability of contracting
parties generally, and especially of parties to bailment contracts, to exonerate themselves from liability for their negligent acts committed while in
the performance of such contracts has been the subject of many decisions.
One of the first cases to raise the problem was the English case of Maving
v. Todd3 where, by agreement of the parties, the defendant was relieved
from liability for any loss which might result from fire. Lord Ellenborough
is there reported to have held that "a wharfinger . . .may entirely get rid
1 - Ohio App. -, 93 N. E. (2d) 788 (1950). McNamee, J., wrote a dissenting
opinion.
2 But see Bernstein v. Northwestern Nat. Bank in Philadelphia, 159 Pa. Super. 73,
41 A. (2d) 440 (1945), for dicta Intimating the possibility that a bank, providing
a night depositary, might limit its liability to a depositor by agreement.
3 4 Camp. 225, 171 Eng. Rep. 72 (1815).
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of his liability for loss by fire."

Claiming descent from that case, there

is a seemingly settled area of English law which appears to champion the
right of a bailee to exonerate himself by agreement from any liability for
4
his negligence.
American courts, on the other hand, have viewed these exoneration
agreements with a degree of hostility, crediting their position to an expression of public policy. 5 The basis for that policy has not always been
entirely clear, but it would appear that courts have feared that if a bailee
for hire was allowed to free himself from that duty to exercise ordinary
care which the law would normally impose upon him the result would be
to produce a tendency to perform contracts containing such stipulations
in a careless fashion.6 In opposition to this position, however, is an equally
well established policy permitting the utmost freedom of contract to competent parties which presents, with force, the counter-argument that what
7
one may refuse to do entirely, he may well agree to do but conditionally.
Apparently both these policies are sufficiently persuasive that courts are
still engaged in the process of resolving the conflict thus presented.
The first reaction of American courts when faced with the problem of
resolving these opposing policies seems to have been one of reluctance to
meet the issue squarely and to rule on the essential validity of the exoneration provisions involved in the agreements coming before them. Instead,
and as an alternative, the principle of strict construction was adopted, so
that unless freedom from liability for negligence was expressly included,
contracts were to be construed as if they made no reference to it.8 This
was clearly an effort to achieve solution by evasion for, in many cases, the
particular stipulation was rendered meaningless after the element of freedom from negligence was obliterated because not precisely framed in apt
language. Although the Arkansas court concerned with the case of Gu/f
Compass Compamy v. Harrington9 recognized this to be the case, it never4 See, for example, Rutter v. Palmer (1922), 2 K. B. 87, 14 B. R. C. 101; Travers
& Sons v. Cooper (1915), 1 K. B. (C. A.) 73.
5 England v. Lyon Fireproof Storage Co., 94 Cal. App. 562, 271 P. 532 (1928)
Denver Union Terminal Co. v. Cullinan, 72 Colo. 248, 210 P. 602, 27 A. L. R. 154
(1922) : Malone v. Santora, 135 Conn. 294, 64 A. (2d) 51 (1949) ; Agricultural Ins.
Co. v. Constantine, 144 Ohio St. 275, 58 N. E. (2d) 658 (1944).
6 Such an apprehension was voiced in Kenney v. Wong, 81 N. H. 427, 128 A. 343
(1925).
7 Mann v. Pere Marquette R. Co., 135 Mich. 210, 97 N. W. 721 (1903).
8 Dieterle v. Bekin, 143 Cal. 683, 77 P. 664 (1904) ; Pure Torpedo Corp. v. Nation,
327 Ill. App. 28, 63 N. E. (2d) 600 (1945) ; Weinberger v. Werremeyer, 224 Ill. App.
217 (1922) ; Woodward v. Royal Carpet Cleaning Co., 16 La. App. 555, 134 So. 443
(1931) ; Railton v. Taylor, 20 R. I. 300, 38 A. 980 (1897) ; Langford v. Nevin, 117
Tex. 130, 298 S.W. 536 (1937). But see Mann v. Pere Marquette R. Co., 135 Mich.
210, 97 N. W. 721 (1903), where the court held it was error to fail to construe a
typical exoneration clause as intended to include negligence.
990 Ark. 256, 119 S.W. 249, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1205 (1909).
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theless applied the rule of strict construction toward a warehouse receipt
which purported to relieve the warehouseman from liability for loss resulting from fire, thereby denying protection of the immunity clause where
the fire had resulted from the warehouseman's own negligence. It said, in
part, that it might be argued that this construction entirely emasculated
the stipulation and rendered it meaningless. Nevertheless, it continued, the
"argument affords no reason for importing into the contract a stipulation
for exemption from liability for negligence which the parties themselves
have not seen fit to express in apt words-a stipulation, too, which the law
at least discourages when it does not positively forbid."10 The case may
be said to reflect a typical approach to the subject but one hardly likely
to aid in developing the law on the point.
A
An
area of compromise has been reached, in resolving the conflict
between the so-called "public policy" and the one respecting freedom of
contract, in those cases wherein bailees for hire have been allowed the
benefit of exculpatory language designed to limit the monetary extent of
liability, provided the limitation bears a reasonable relation to the value
of the bailed article and the consideration paid the bailee for his services.
Typical of these situations are those cases which involve persons engaged
in the business of checking parcels." Although such persons would be
liable for negligent harms inflicted up to the stipulated amount, the granting of validity to stipulations designed to exonerate from liability for any
excess damage, even when caused by the bailee's own negligence, represents a broad concession.
Closely related thereto are those cases in which the courts have recognized the validity of agreements intended to limit a bailee's liability to the
amount of the declared valuation of the bailed article. 1 2 Such agreements
are generally employed where a graduated fee is charged by the bailee
commensurate with the declared value of the property, a method frequently
employed by warehousemen. It is interesting to note, -inthat regard, that
while the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act 1 3 prohibits a warehouseman
from inserting a clause in his receipt tending to impair his obligation to
exercise reasonable care, an indication of the legislatively-expressed public

10 90

Ark. 256 at 259, 119 S. W. 249 at 250.
11 Noyes v. Hines, 220 Ill.
App. 409 (1920); Jones v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 68
Mont. 231, 217 P. 673, 37 A. L. R. 754 (1923); Terry v. Southern Ry. Co., 81 S. C.
279, 62 S. E. 249, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 295 (1908).
12 The court concerned with the case of D'Utassy v. Barrett, 219 N. Y. 420, 114
N. E. 786, 5 A. L. R. 979 (1916), pointed to a distinction between provisions intended
to limit liability to a fixed amount and those designed to limit liability to the
declared valuation of the bailed property. Compare that case, however, with the
holdings in Brown v. Hines, 213 Mo. App. 298, 249 S. W. 683 (1923), and Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co. v. Higbee Co., 80 Ohio App. 437, 76 N. E. (2d) 404, 174
A. L. R. 1429 (1947).
13 Unif. Laws Anno., Vol. 3, p. 13, § 3(b).
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policy specifically applicable to warehousemen, some courts, even in those
jurisdictions which have adopted the uniform act, have construed the
provision as not being sufficient to prohibit the so-called "declared valua14
tion" agreements.
Actually, the true problem is not merely whether or not a bailee for
hire may limit his liability but when and to what extent he may do so.
General expressions to the effect that exoneration agreements are contrary
to public policy should not be relied upon too wholeheartedly because
courts expressing the thought more likely mean that, under the particular
circumstances involved in the case being considered, it would be contrary
to public policy to allow the particular bailee to absolve himself from
liability for his negligence. This fact is made the more apparent if the
comparison is not attempted between the decisions found in a series of
states but is confined to holdings of different courts in any one state. 15
While the basis for reconciling these decisions has not yet been reduced
to a formula susceptible of universal application, several explanations have
been suggested.
One factor appearing to possess a placatory effect on the judicial
hostility toward exoneration agreements exists where the amount of the
compensation paid the bailee is such that it would not justify the cost
involved in taking those precautionary measures which would normally be
necessary to insulate him from a charge of negligence. The extreme to
which a court may be moved by the presence of such an argument is well
illustrated by the case of Burrill v. The Dollar Savings Bank, 16 although
the case actually involved not a bailment but the validity of a by-law of a
bank designed to limit its liability to its depositors. The court there,
accepting the provision to be valid, indicated its concern over situations
where a good deal of effort would be required to prevent loss in return for
only a modest compensation. It said that savings banks were really "charities for the poor. With many thousands of depositors they can only save
themselves from imposition and loss by rules strictly enforced. The rule
under which the defendants claim protection is a very reasonable one, and
necessary for their safety.''17 Even stronger intimation of the weight
which the element of compensation bears in determining the validity of
exoneration agreements is to be found in those cases which recognize the
14 George v. Bekins Van & Storage Co., 33 Cal. (2d) 834, 205 P. (2d) 1037 (1949) ;
French v. Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 118 Colo. 424, 195 P. (2d) 968 (1948). See
also Williston, Contracts, Vol. 4, § 1046.
15 Compare, for example, Werner v. Knoll, 89 Cal. App. (2d) 474, 201 P. (2d) 45
(1948), with England v. Lyon Fireproof Storage Co., 94 Cal. App. 562, 271 P. 532
(1928).

16 92 Pa. 134, 37 Am. Rep. 669 (1879).
17 92 Pa. 134 at 138, 37 Am. Rep. 669 at 670.
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ability of a bailee for hire to limit his liability for his negligence provided
the bailor has an option to secure full liability upon payment of an additional reasonable charge. At least one court has upheld such an agreement
where the bailee was a common carrier, hence would normally be subject
to the duty to exercise the highest degree of care.' s
A more recent proposal suggests that courts should give consideration
to the comparative bargaining power of the parties. 19 Where the bailee,
for example, occupies a superior position by virtue of a monopoly over
facilities for affording the type of service the bailor needs, or at least where
the bailor may not readily resort to someone else for that service, or where
the bailor is not in a position to object to the provisions of a bailment
agreement prepared by the bailee, courts will be prone to announce the
rule that exculpatory provisions contained in an agreement formed under
such circumstances are contrary to public policy. 20 A similar result is
likely to be reached where the bailee is engaged in a course of general
dealing with the public indiscriminately, somewhat in the fashion which
would be true of railroads and other utilities, so as to affect the business
with a public, as contrasted to an essentially private, interest. 21 Cases
involving bailees engaged in operating parking lots22 or garages 23 bear
witness to a hesitancy on the part of courts to enforce exculpatory provisions in their agreements, which tendency disappears when the parties
24
are on an equal footing at the moment of bargaining.
Although the court in the instant case recognized the importance of
weighing the comparative bargaining power of the parties, it was conFranklin v. Southern Pac. Co., 203 Cal. 680, 265 P. 936 (1928).
The suggestion appears in a note in 37 Col. L. Rev. 248 and in an annotation in
175 A. L. R. 16.
20 Fairfax Gas & Supply Co. v. Hadary, 151 F. (2d) 939 (1945); Bennett v.
American Nat. Bank, 130 Okla. 23, 264 P. 912 (1928) ; Sporsem v. First Nat. Bank,
133 Wash. 199, 233 P. 641, 40 A. L. R. 854 (1925).
21 Denver Union Terminal Ry. Co. v. Cullinan, 72 Colo. 248, 210 P. 602, 27 A. L. R.
754 (1922). In Restatement, Contracts, Vol. 2, § 575(b), the statement is made
that a bargain for exemption from liability for negligence is illegal if ". . . one of
the parties is charged with a public service, and the bargain relates to negligence
in the performance of any part of its duty to the public for which it has received or
been promised compensation."
22 Malone v. Santora, 135 Conn. 294, 64 A. (2d) 51 (1949) ; Wendt v. Sley System
Garages, 124 Pa. Super. 224, 188 A. 624 (1936) ; Balone v. Heavey, 103 Pa. Super.
529, 158 A. 181 (1932).
2
3Grove v. Borchers, - Ohio App. -, 80 N. E. (2d) 208 (1948) ; Simms v. Sullivan, 100 Ore. 487, 19 P. 240, 15 A. L. R. 678 (1921) ; Pilson v. Tip-Top Auto Co.,
67 Ore. 528, 136 P. 642 (1913).
24 Charles Lachman Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 79 F. Supp. 206 (1948); Stephens
v. Southern Pac. Co., 109 Cal. 86, 41 P. 783, 29 L. R. A. 751 (1895); Evans &
Pennington v. Nail, 1 Ga. App. 42, 57 S. E. 1020 (1907) ; Chekley v. Illinois Central
R. Co., 171 Ill. App. 203 (1912) ; Smith v. Library Board, 58 Minn. 108, 59 N. W.
979, 25 L. R. A. 280 (1894) ; Sanchez v. Blumberg, 176 S. W. 904 (Tex. Civ. App.,
1915).
18

19
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fronted by an additional consideration. Admittedly, the bank was conducting a business vitally touching the public interest and was in a position
to dictate the terms upon which it would accept deposits, terms which the
depositor was hardly in a position to dispute. It was a fact, however, that
it would be unlikely that a representative of the bank would be present
when night deposits were being made so that the only person apt to have
actual knowledge of the fact of the deposit would be the depositor himself.
As a result, the bank would be at the mercy of a dishonest depositor for
it would be without the means to prove that an alleged deposit had not, in
fact, been made. 25 This aspect of the case, foreign to the ordinary bailment
arrangement, called for special dispensation under which the bank might
protect itself by stipulating for a complete exoneration until after the
night vault had been opened, the contents examined, and the same accepted
for credit to the customer's account. Thereafter, of course, the relationship
would be one of debtor and creditor rather than bailor and bailee. To
refuse complete exoneration and to limit the contract to one fixing a
maximum liability, as was urged by the dissenting judge, would not resolve
the bank's predicament; it would still be defenseless against dishonest
claims to the extent to which it would be contractually liable. On this
ground, then, the result reached in the instant case appears to be entirely
reasonable.
It would seem, however, that caution should be exercised in recognizing
the validity of exoneration agreements in all except such special cases.
As one writer puts it, the effect of "letting the bars of public policy down
and freedom of contract in, where the policy has been tried, has not proven
an unquestioned and indisputable success. "26 To allow a reaction against
the inequity of holding all exoneration agreements to be invalid to become
a pendulum swinging too far in the other extreme would merely result in
the substitution of injustice to the bailor for that which previously had
been endured by the bailee.
A. B. KALNITZ
25

The banking practice appeared to be one under which the night depository was

opened only by joint action of two bank employees, one possessing a key and the
other informed as to the vault combination, who then tallied the padlocked numbered sacks which contained the deposits made by the customers, which sacks were
'thereafter placed in the cashier's cage to await call by the customer who would, on
arrival, open the sack, remove and bank the contents. Assuming such practice to
have been followed at all times, and assuming the honesty of the bank employees,
there would seem to be little likelihood that the customer would be placed at the
mercy of the bank because he was unable to receive an immediate receipt for, or a
record of, his deposit. He could, as in the instant case, use the services of an eyewitness if he needed corroboration evidence.
26 Willis, "The Right of Bailees to Contract Against Liability for Negligence,"
20 Harv. L. Rev. 297 (1907), at p. 312.
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CORPORATIONS-CAPITAL, STOCK, AND DIVIDENDS-WHETHER PROVISIONS

OF UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER ACT MAKE DELIVERY NON-ESSENTIAL TO A
OF SHARE OF CORPORATE STOCK-The United States Court of
VALED Gir
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in the recent case of Nagano v. McGrath,

Attorney General,' decided for the first time the effect to be given to
the provisions of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act

2

relating to delivery in

connection with the transfer of title of shares of stock. The plaintiff, a
native-born citizen of Japan, entered the United States as a permanent
resident and engaged in the manufacture

3
of oriental food products.

Later, the plaintiff transferred his business to a corporation, causing nearly
all of the shares of its stock to be issued in his own name or in the name
of his wife. 4 When the corporation, some years later, declared a stock
dividend, the plaintiff, who dominated the enterprise, caused a single
certificate for the additional shares to be issued in his wife's name, including therein his portion of the stock dividend. This supplemental certificate
was never actually delivered to the :Wife but was kept by the plaintiff.
For that matter, he never informed his wife of the action which had been
taken. Following the outbreak of war with Japan, and before plaintiff's
wife had returned to this country, the Alien Property Custodian seized all
of the shares of stock standing in the wife's name under the authority of
the Trading with the Enemy Act. 5 Plaintiff thereafter sued to recover the
additional shares, claiming title on the ground that he had never made
a valid gift of his portion of the stock dividend and asserting to be a
bailee for his wife's original stock. The plaintiff appealed from an order
dismissing the complaint,6 which order had been entered by the District
1187 F. (2d) 753 (1951), reversing 85 F. Supp. 368 (1949).
See also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 32,
§ 416 et seq.
3 Subsequent thereto, on a visit to Japan, the plaintiff married a native citizen
of that country. The wife remained in Japan until the birth of a daughter, then
came to the United States as a permanent resident. The passage of the Immigration Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 153, 8 U. S. C. A. § 145 et seq., made it impossible for the
daughter, as well as a second daughter born in Japan while the parents were there
on a visit, not previously admitted to the United States, to join her parents in this
country. The wife, therefore, remained in Japan with the intention of returning to
this country when the daughters had grown up and had married.
4 187 F. (2d) 753 at 755. It was admitted that the original shares of stock issued
in the wife's name constituted a valid gift to her by the plaintiff.
5 50 U. S. C. A., App. § 9(a), as amended December 18, 1941.
6 The appeal in the instant case was limited to the question of plaintiff's right
to the shares which he claimed as his own property. His right to the possession
of the balance of the stock as bailee for his wife, dependent on her right as owner,
was made the subject of a separate appeal: Nagano v. McGrath, 187 F. (2d) 759
(1951).
2 6 Unif. Laws Anno., p. 1 et seq.

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS

Court on the basis of the prior Illinois decision in Chicago Title & Trust
Company v. Ward,7 a case which held that a transfer of shares on the
books of the corporation operated to pass legal title to the person named
in the stock certificate. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the decision on the ground that the Uniform Stock Transfer Act s had effectively
changed prior case law in Illinois and required delivery as well as, and in
addition to, endorsement, assignment or transfer on the books of the corporation in order to pass a complete title to the stock.
To reach this conclusion, the court found it necessary to construe the
applicable section pertaining to the delivery 9 together with another section
dealing with the effect of an attempt to transfer title without delivery of
the certificate. 10 The court stated: "To say that a transfer on the books
of a corporation constitutes a delivery within the contemplation of the Act
would be to render meaningless that statutory requirement that there be
a delivery even in the case where the corporation has expressly provided
that its shares are transferable on its books and by no other method."' 1
The decision would seem to conform to the fundamental purpose of the
Uniform Stock Transfer Act, as that purpose is disclosed in the Commissioners' note, 12 which purpose seems to be to make the stock certificate
representative of the shares to the fullest extent possible. All other deci7

332 Ill. 126, 163 N. E. 319 (1928).

Although the case was decided after Illinois

had adopted the uniform statute, the transfer took place long prior to its passage.
The decision makes no reference to the statute nor does it purport to be grounded
thereon.
8 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 416, provides: "Title to a certificate and
to the shares represented thereby can be transferred only: (a) By delivery of the
certificate indorsed either in blank or to a specified person by the person appearing
by the certificate to be the owner of the shares represented thereby, or (b) By
delivery of the certificatee [sic] and a separate document containing a written
assignment of the certificate or a power of attorney to sell, assign, or transfer the
same or the shares represented thereby, signed by the person appearing by the
certificate to be the owner of the shares represented thereby. Such assignment or
power of attorney may be either in blank or to a specified person." There is a
proviso to the effect that the statute shall be applicable even though the charter or
articles of incorporation, or the certificate itself, shall provide that the shares shall

be transferable only on the books of the corporation.
9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 416.
10 Ibid., § 425, provides: "An attempted transfer of title to a certificate or to the
shares represented thereby without delivery of the certificate shall have the effect
of a promise to transfer and the obligation, if any, imposed by such promise shall
be determined by the law governing the formation and performance of contracts."
11 187 F. (2d) 753 at 757.
12 At 6 Unif. Laws Anno., p. 2, appears the statement: "The provisions of this
section are in accordance with the existing law, except that the transfer of the
certificate is here made to operate as a transfer of the shares, whereas at common
law it is the registry on the books of the company which makes the complete
transfer. The reason for the change is in order that the certificate may, to the
fullest extent possible, be the representative of the shares. This is the fundamental
purpose of the whole act, and is in accordance with the mercantile usage. The
transfer on the books becomes thus like the record of a deed of real estate under a
registry system."
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sions directly in point have reached the same conclusion, 13 and textual
writers also agree therewith. 14 Other provisions of the Act would also
indicate a legislative intent to make the requirement of delivery into
a mandatory one, for Section 10 provides that an attempted transfer of
shares without delivery of the certificate has no more effect than that of
a promise to transfer,' 5 while Section 13 provides that no attachment or
levy upon shares of stock shall be valid until the certificate has been
actually seized by the officer making the attachment or levy.16
Although there have been a few decisions which might seem to have
reached a contrary conclusion, all such cases can be differentiated on the
basis of the factual situation involved. At common law, the voluntary
17
transfer of possession from one person to another constituted a delivery.
The Uniform Stock Transfer Act has not changed this rule, so delivery
of the stock certificate to a third person may be sufficient. In the case of
Snidow v. National Bank of Narrows,'8 for example, the donor wrote a
letter addressed to the donee, stating his intention to make a gift, and put
the letter and the certificates in a safety deposit vault, giving the key to
the bank cashier with instructions to deliver the same to the donee. The
court held these acts amounted to a valid delivery. A subsequent decision
in the same jurisdiction reached the same conclusion where the donor had
requested a friend, already in possession of the stock certificate, to transfer
the same to the donee. 1 9 The court held the gift was consummated on the
delivery of written instructions to make the transfer. Written instructions
to a bailee, in possession of the stock certificates, to hold them for the
donee have been held to constitute a gift provided the bailee, expressly or
impliedly, assents to the instruction. 20 Delivery to the donor's agent,
however, will be ineffectual 2 ' for the agent is no more than the alter ego
13 In

re Broomhall, Killough & Co., Inc., 47 F. (2d) 948 (1930) ; Daws v. Drusilla

Home, 118 Ind. App. 639, 79 N. E. (2d) 420 (1948) ; Lockhart v. Dickey, 161 La.
282, 108 So. 483 (1926); Parker v. Colonial Building-Loan Ass'n, 111 N. J. Eq. 49,
161 A. 353, 99 A. L. R. 1077 (1932) ; Besson v. Stevvens, 94 N. J. Eq. 549, 120 A. 640
(1923) ; Figuers v. Sherrell, 181 Tenn. 87, 178 S. W. (2d) 629. (1944).
14 Christy and McLean, The Transfer of Stock (Baker, Voorhis & Co., New York,
1940) ; Modesitt, "Application of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act to Gifts of Stock,"
20 Rocky Mount. L. Rev. 67 (1947) ; Mechem, "Gifts of Corporation Shares," 20 Ill.
L. Rev. 9 (1925) ; 38 C. J. S., Gifts, § 46.
15 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 425.
16 Ibid., § 428.
17 38 C. J. S., Gifts, § 46.
18 178 Va. 239, 16 S. E. (2d) 385 (1941), noted in 28 Va. L. Rev. 418.
19 Payne v. Tobacco Trading Corp., 179 Va. 156, 18 S. E. (2d) 281 (1942).
20 Richardson v. Commissioner, 126 F. (2d) 562 (1942).
21 Cross v. Cross, 20 N. J. Misc. 359, 27 A. (2d) 877 (1942).
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of the principal and possession by the agent is deemed to be possession on
the part of the principal. Just as at common law, a symbolic delivery, such
as the delivery of a letter 22 or a key to a safety deposit vault containing
the stock,23 may be sufficient.
The problem of delivery would appear to be a somewhat complicated
one where the donor wishes to make the donee a joint owner of the stock,
but courts quite generally have held, in such situations, that delivery to
one of the joint owners is sufficient. 24 This view is in accordance with a
general rule to the effect that, where cotenants own personalty not easily
divisible, the possession of one cotenant is, in contemplation of law, the
possession of the other. 25 It is also possible for a donor to constitute
himself trustee for the benefit of the donee so as to prevent the rise of any
question as to delivery. 26 If the donor should appoint a third person as
trustee, however, a failure to deliver the stock certificate will cause the
trust to fail for want of a trust res to support it27 since, in the absence of
consideration, the implied promise to convey legal title could not be
enforced.
An examination of all of the decided cases pertaining to delivery of
a gift of stock wherein the provisions of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act
were applicable discloses that delivery has been regarded as a mandatory
requirement. Cases seemingly in contradiction involve nothing more than
variations in the manner of delivery which would not have been exceptional under the general rule made applicable to gifts at common law.
The instant case, therefore, merely reiterates the common law rule and
demonstrates that shares of stock, for this purpose, by statutory mandate,
are to be treated on the same basis as other common-law choses in action.
It is noteworthy, however, for having served to abrogate a common law
rule to the effect that a transfer on the books of the corporation would be
sufficient to vest legal title in the donee.
H. E. GORMAN
22 Hillary Holding Corp. v. Brooklyn Jockey Club, 88 N. Y. S. (2d) 198 (1949),
decision pursuant to opinion in 273 App. Div. 538, 78 N. Y. S. (2d) 151 (1948).
23 In Succession of McGuire, 151 La. 514, 92 So. 40 (1922).
24 Young v. Cockman, 182 Md. 246, 34 A. (2d) 428 (1943) ; Imparato v. Luscardi,
123 N. J. Eq. 298, 197 A. 379 (1938) ; East Rutherford Say., Loan & Build. Ass'n v.
McKenzie, 87 N. J. Eq. 375, 100 A. 931 (1917) ; Gugle v. Ghgle, 83 Ohio App. 85,
78 N. E. (2d) 585 (1948) ; In re Connell's Estate, 282 Pa. 55.5, 128 A. 503 (1925).
25 14 Am. Jur., Cotenancy, § 23.
26 Hudgens v. Tillman, 227 Ala. 672, 151 So. 863 (1934) ; Fall River National Bank
v. Estes, 279 Mass. 380, 181 N. E. 242 (1932).
27 Johnson v. Johnson, 300 Mass. 24, 13 N. E. (2d) 788 (1938).
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CORPORATIONS--OFFICERS AND AGENTS-WHETHER OR NOT A DIRECTOR
MAY SECUI
REIMBURSEMENT FROM HIS CORPORATION FOR HIS ATTORNEYS'
FEES WHEN HE HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN THE DEFENSE OF A STOCKHOLDER'S
DERIVATIVE ACTION-A problem which heretofore has received little judicial
attention but which is, nevertheless, one of importance, was recently passed
on by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in the case of In re E. C. Warner
2
Company.' The problem concerned the right of a director to be reimbursed
by his corporation for his attorneys' fees after he had been judicially
vindicated in a suit brought against him for an alleged dereliction of duty.
The facts of the case disclosed that shortly after a derivative action had
been concluded in favor of the director, the corporation entered into voluntary dissolution and a receiver was appointed. Pursuant to an order
directing creditors to present claims, the attorneys who had represented
the director in the derivative action advanced a demand for the services

they had rendered in his behalf.3 The receiver, in doubt as to the propriety
of the claim, sought a determination as to its validity and the claim was
allowed by the trial court. That holding was affirmed on an appeal taken

by certain interested stockholders. In

arriving at that conclusion, the

higher court reasoned that the director not only had a right to resist the
suit but was also under a duty to do so since, if

he allowed the action

to go unchallenged, it would result in the removal from corporate guidance
of one to whom that guidance had been committed by the stockholders.
The court also indicated that if a contrary rule prevailed it would succeed

in deterring men of ability and substance from assuming the responsibilities of a director.
The rule has become well established that when

a

stockholder

is

successful in the prosecution of a derivative action he is entitled to reim-

bursement for counsel fees expended toward that end, 4 particularly so if
the action has conferred a tangible benefit on the corporation by creating,

increasing or protecting a corporate fund. 5 The corporation, although
1
Minn. -, 45 N. W. (2d) 388 (1950).
2 Reimbursement, as used herein, will be considered synonymous with exoneration
since it makes no difference whether the corporation pays the fees directly to
counsel or merely reimburses the director for sums already spent.
3 The opinion does not reveal the basis for the right of the attorneys to present
the claim in their own names. It seems clear that, without an assignment or some
other contractual right, there would be a procedural defect since proceedings to
recover for attorneys' fees are typically brought by the litigant in his own name.
4 Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 48 F. Supp. 504 (1942) ; Auer v. Win. Meyer
Co., 322 Ill. App. 244, 54 N. R. (2d) 394 (1944). See also Hornstein, "The Counsel
Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits," 39 Col. L. Rev. 784 (1939), and annotation in
152 A. L. R. 909 at 914.
5 Bingham v. Ditzler, 320 Ill. App. 88, 49 N. E. (2d) 812 (1943), noted in 22
CnHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 159. It was there suggested that it might be desirable
to have a statute permitting the corporation to obtain, reimbursement from the
director.
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nominally a defendant in such suit, is in reality the successful party and
equitably should bear the cost of litigation which has resulted in its
advantage. With such a rule acting as a constant stimulus to disgruntled
stockholders to bring derivative actions to the vexation of directors, it
seems anomalous that only four courts should have had occasion to pass
upon the problem presented by the instant case. 6
In the first of these decisions, that by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
in the case of Figge v. Bergenthal,7 the court, allowing reimbursement to
the directors, simply said: "Clearly, if no case is made against defendants
it is not improper or unjust that the corporation should pay for the defense
of the action."s Twenty-five years later, the Ohio court concerned in the
case of Griesse v. Lang,9 incorrectly deeming the Figge case to have been
overruled by a subsequent Wisconsin case,' 0 decided that reimbursement
should be denied to the judicially vindicated directors. In reaching that
result, the court relied on the familiar general rule that corporation funds
may only be expended or used to the advantage of the corporation or for
purposes stated in the charter unless assent is given by all the stockholders." It, therefore, took a strict approach to the problem, making it
encumbent upon the directors to show that their defense of the action had
produced a benefit for the corporation, a point exceedingly difficult to
establish. 12 It has remained for two subsequent cases, however, to crystal6 A note in 25 Corn. L. Q. 437 suggests that the reasons for the paucity of cases
on the question are: (1) that usually no claim for reimbursement is made, and
(2) that appropriation for the expense incurred is made by the corporation without
objection from the stockholders.
7 130 Wis. 594, 109 N. W. 581 (1906). It should be noted that the case was not
strictly a derivative suit but was a remedial action for fraud and mismanagement
based on a statute. That factor, however, should not affect the validity of the case
for the present purpose.
8 130 Wis. 594 at 625, 109 N. W. 581 at 592. A headnote to Stendall v. Longshoreman's P. U. B. Ass'n, 116 La. 974, 41 So. 228 (1906), states: "The expenses
of a suit against the officers of a corporation to oust them from office are at the
charge of the corporation, and not of the officers." While the statement would
appear to support the language of the Wisconsin court, it is valueless for present
purposes since there is no reference to the point in the opinion itself.
937 Ohio App. 553, 175 N. E. 222 (1931), noted in 27 Ky. L. J. 102, 16 Minn. L.
Rev. 102.
10 Jesse v. Four Wheel Drive Auto Co., 177 Wis. 627, 189 N. W. 276 (1922). That
case and Figge v. Bergenthal, 130 Wis. 594, 109 N. W. 581 (1906), are clearly distinguishable on their facts.
11 Joy v. Jackson & Michigan Plank Road Co., 11 Mich. 155 (1863) ; Jesse v. Four
Wheel Drive Auto Co., 177 Wis. 627, 189 N. W. 277 (1922).
12 Benefit to the corporation flowing from the successful defense of a derivative
action by the director would be indirect at best. A note in 27 Ky. L. J. 102 suggests that a benefit might accrue to the corporation in that the director would be
apt to extend himself to the best of his ability to serve the corporation after the
entity has accorded him just treatment by the payment of his legal expenses.
Something more tangible would seem to be necessary. In Godley v. Crandall &
Godley Co., 181 App. Div. 75, 168 N. Y. S. 251 (1917), affirmed without opinion in
227 N. Y. 656, 126 N. E. 908 (1920), a suit to appoint a receiver for the corporation
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lize the divergence of legal opinion which encompasses the question here
discussed.
Perhaps the strongest expression of judicial authority supporting the
negative side of the question is the New York case of New York Dock
Company, Inc. v. McCollom,1 3 wherein the corporation sought a declaratory

judgment to the effect that it was not legally obligated to pay its directors
for the expense which they had incurred in the successful defense of a
derivative action. 14 The court, deciding for the corporation, reasoned that
in the first place there was no implied contract which would entitle the
directors to recovery. In that connection, cases involving other fiduciaries
were rejected as being inapplicable to the situation of a director who was
said to be sui generis. Secondly, the court held there was no broad equitable
obligation to repay the directors, relying on the authority of the Griesse
case as well as on the proposition that liability to stockholders suits was a
risk attendant upon the acceptance of a directorship. 15 Lastly, it dismissed
the social argument, one to the effect that unless a right of reimbursement
was established men of ability would hesitate to accept directorships, on
the ground that the settled law of the state made it impossible to lend
it any weight.
On the other hand, the New Jersey case of Solimine v. Hollander'6
evolved a contrary result, permitting the judicially vindicated directors
to obtain reimbursement for their attorneys' fees. To achieve that result,
the court found it necessary to rationalize that derivative suits were not a
hazard assumed by directors but rather that it was the duty of directors
to defend against unjust charges in order that corporate guidance should
not be wrested from those in whom the stockholders had placed their
trust. For support, the court relied on a trust case which had decided that
the trust estate was liable for counsel fees incurred by a trustee who had
been successful in defending an action brought to remove him as trustee
for alleged mismanagement.' 7 That principle was held applicable to a
director for, while the court was careful not to denominate him a trustee,
was successfully resisted by the director. See also Esposito v. Riverside Sand &
Gravel Co., 287 Mass. 185, 191 N. E. 363 (1934) ; Albrecht, Maguire & Co. v. General
Plastics, 256 App. Div. 134, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 415 (1939), affirmed without opinion in
280 N. Y. 840, 21 N. E. (2d) 887 (1939) ; and annotation in 152 A. L. R. 909 at
p. 922.
13 173 Misc. 106, 16 N. Y. S. (2d) 844 (1939), noted in 25 Corn. L. Q. 437.
14 It is to be noted that the presentation of the question in this form framed the
issue narrowly and made the director's task more difficult. See Washington, "Litigation Expenses of Corporate Directors in Stockholders' Suits," 40 Col. L. Rev. 431

(1940), particularly pp. 442-3.
15 The court intimated that if the defense had been beneficial to the corporation
indemnification would have been appropriate.
16129 N. J. Eq. 264, 19 A. (2d) 344 (1941), noted in 26 Minn. L. Rev. 119.
17 Jessup v. Smith, 223 N. Y. 203, 119 N. E. 403 (1918).
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it recognized a substantial similarity in the fiduciary attributes of each.
Although the court did not rest its decision on the "benefit" theory, it
considered that the successful defense of the derivative action by the
director had produced a benefit to the corporation by demonstrating the
honest purpose of the corporate management to the investing public.
Further reason for the holding was said to be found in the fact
that it would serve to induce men of high business acumen to accept
directorships.' 8
The basic difference between the McCollom and the Solimine cases
turns on the unwillingness of the former to accord to directors the same
fiduciary privileges as are applicable to trustees, executors, and receivers.
The right of each of these fiduciaries to reimbursement for counsel fees
expended in the successful resistance of suits brought to remove them for
alleged abuse of trust is well established. 19 It would seem as if the underlying principle which supports a right of repayment for these other
fiduciaries should be made applicable to directors even though, in other
respects, they are sui generis.20 Courts willing to look at the problem
in this light would find adequate basis from which to overcome the contention that the defense of a derivative action is a risk attendant upon
the acceptance of a directorship.
Another difference concerns the argument that if a rule were established which would deny reimbursement there would be few men of high
business caliber who would be willing to accept directorships. The policy
underlying this argument was curtly dismissed in the McCollom case, but
was strongly relied on in both the Solimine and the instant cases. Statutory
restrictions developed in recent years, together with the imposition of higher
standards, have made the director's position one extremely vulnerable to
suit although he usually continues to receive no more than nominal compensation for the assumption of these added risks. 21 The equities, therefore,
18 An indirect product of this argument would be that directors of limited means
would be able to retain more competent, and presumably more costly, counsel than
might otherwise be the case if it was known that the financially abler corporation
would stand the expense of a successful defense.
19 As to trustees, see Jessup v. Smith, 223 N. Y. 203, 119 N. E. 403 (1918). The
rights of executors are considered in Pinckard's Distributees v. Pinckard's Adm'rs,
24 Ala. 250 (1854) ; In re Levinson's Estate, 108 Cal. 450, 41 P. 483 (1895) ; Armstrong v. Boyd, 140 Ga. 710, 79 S. E. 780 (1913) ; Jacobs v. Jacobs, 99 Mo. 427,
12 S. W. 457 (1889). See also Woerner, The American Law of Administration
(Little, Brown & Co., New York, 1899), 2d Ed., §§ 515-7. As to receivers, see
Missouri & K. I. Ry. Co. v. Edson, 224 F. 79 (1915). Public officials have not been
accorded this treatment but the holding may be reconciled on the ground that public
funds are concerned: Chapman v. City of New York, 168 N. Y. 80, 61 N. E. 108
(1901).
20 Stevens, Handbook on the Law of Private Corporations (West Publishing Co.,
St. Paul, 1949), 2d Ed., p. 647, and cases there cited, provides a discussion of the
legal characteristics of a director.
21 Washington, "Litigation Expenses of Corporate Directors in Stockholders'
Suits," 40 Col. L. Rev. 431 (1940), at p. 432.
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support a claim for reimbursement but subject to two important limitations.
One is that there should be no indemnification unless the director has been
vindicated on the merits of the derivative action. 2 2 The other is that none
of the corporate funds should be expended toward the personal defense
of the director during the course of the trial. 23 Without these limitations,
the ability of stockholders to protect themselves from the acts of dishonest
directors would be seriously impaired.
The force of the New York decision in the McCollom case may also
be said to be shaken by legislative action which has been taken in that
state, action designed not only to shut off the frequency of "strike" suits
by minority stockholders but also to insure indemnification for the vindicated and diligent director. 24 If there should be fear that other courts,
when first faced with the problem, would be inclined to follow a traditional, rather than a liberal approach, the answer would seem to lie in the
enactment elsewhere of similar legislation.
A. S. GRENE

GRAND JURY-ATTENDANCE AND EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES-WHETHER
REIFUSAL TO ANSWER SEvERAL QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE SAME

OR NoT A

SUBJECT MATTER WARRANTS PUNrSHMENT AS FOR SEVERAL CONTEP'rS-

Frequent reiteration, by witnesses who have recently appeared before various congressional committees, of the stock answer "I refuse to answer on
constitutional grounds," has tended to make the remark somewhat of a
colloquialism but it has also produced a number of legal problems.' One
such problem arose in a New York habeas corpus proceeding entitled
People ex rel. Anarante v. McDonnell.2 The relator there, on interrogation
before a grand jury, had been asked seven questions, each of which was
designed to ascertain whether or not he owned or managed a store wherein
forms of gambling had been found to flourish. For refusal to answer any
one of the questions, the relator was taken before an appropriate court
and was sentenced to the maximum fine and term of imprisonment warranted for seven criminal contempts. On petition for habeas corpus chal22

Wood v. Noma Electric Corp., N. Y. L. J. Oct. 10, 1936, p. 1121, col. 7, and

Washington, "Litigation Expenses of Corporate Directors in Stockholders' Suits,"

40 Col. L. Rev. 431 (1940), at p. 540. It has been held that not only must the
defense be as to the merits of the claim but it must also be successful: Witherspoon v. Hornbeing, 70 Colo. 1, 196 P. 865 (1921) ; Monahan v. Kenny, 248 App.
Div. 159, 288 N. Y. S. 323 (1936).
23 Solimine v. Hollander, 129 N. J. Eq. 264, 19 A. (2d) 344 (1941).
24 Cahill's Cons. Laws N. Y., Dec. Supp. 1938-48, Vol. 1, Gen. Corporation Law,
Art. 6A, § 63.
1 A general symposium on the subject of congressional investigations appears in
18 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 421-661 (1951).
2 Misc. -, 100 N. Y. S. (2d) 463 (1950).
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lenging the validity of that judgment, it was held that the relator could
be punished for but one criminal contempt as the questions concerned the
same subject matter and were designed to elicit but one answer.
Before considering the problem presented, it might be well to eliminate
certain other aspects of the general subject which might produce confusion.
If a man is to be punished for one contempt while refusing to answer
questions concerning the same subject matter, it might be thought that,
being punished once, he could not again be punished for again refusing
to answer the same questions. Such, however, is not the law for the rule
as to double jeopardy is inapplicable because each separate occasion is
treated as a separate contumacious act.8 Similarly, a single trial for several
separate and distinct contemptuous acts 4 could well result in several
individual sentences. Acts which have been treated as amounting to separate acts of contempt, however, have usually been characterized by a
separation in point of time, 5 have constituted successive violations of an
injunction, 6 or have represented distinct affronts to the character and
7
dignity of the judge and the court.
With this much distinction, the problem herein involved can be placed
in focus. While there is a paucity of cases on the subject, the outcome and
language of those which have been discovered appears to be identical in
nature. In four cases 8 beside the principal case, it was found to be proper
to impose punishment for but one contempt for, in each case, the questions
asked were devised so as to elicit the same general information. Final
evidence of homogeneity in the cases in this group is to be found in the
likeness of the phrases which were used to characterize the similarity of
the content of the questions. The principal case and one other 9 speak of
3 State v. Kasherman, 177 Minn. 200, 224 N. W. 838 (1929).
4 Ex parte Genecov, 143 Tex. 476, 186 S. W. (2d) 225, 160 A. L. R. 1099 (1945).
5 Solano Aquatic Club v. Superior Court of Solano County, 165 Cal. 278, 131 P.
874 (1913) ; In re Clark, 126 Mo. App. 391, 103 S. W. 1105 (1905).
6 Golden Gate Consol. Hydraulic Min. Co. v. Superior Court, 65 Cal. 187, 3 P. 628
(1884) ; People ex rel. Post v. Grant, 13 N. Y. Civ. Proc. 305 (1888), reversed on
other grounds in 50 Hun. 243, 3 N. Y. S. 142 (1888) ; Ex parte Genecov, 143 Tex.
476, 186 S. W. (2d) 225, 160 A. L. R. 1099 (1945).
7 Hume v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. (2d) 506, 110 P. (2d) 669 (1941) ; Ex parte
Shuler, 210 Cal. 377, 292 P. 481 (1930) ; Lindley v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. App. 419,
245 P. 212 (1926).
8 United States v. Emspak, 95 F. Supp. 1012 (1951) ; United States v. Yukio Abe,
95 F. Supp. 991 (1950) ; Maxwell v. Rives, 11 Nev. 213 (1876) ; Fawick Airflex Co.
v. United Electrical, R. & M. Wkrs., 87 Ohio App. 371, 92 N. E. (2d) 431 (1950).
While the aforementioned cases discuss the problem of single as against multiple
punishment, it is to be noted that in People v. Sheridan, 349 Ill. 202, 181 N. E. 617
(1932), and in People v. Finkel, 157 Misc. 781, 284 N. Y. S. 725 (1935), evasive
answers were given to a number of questions but, without comment, the court
invoked punishment for but one contempt.
9 Fawick Airflex Co. v. United Electrical, R. & M. Wkrs., 87 Ohio App. 371 at 388,
92 N. E. (2d) 431 at 436 (1950). The subject matter of the questions asked concerned whether or not the witness was, or ever had been, affiliated with the
Communist Party.
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the "same subject matter"; another uses the phrase "one subject of
inquiry" ;1o still another speaks of the questions as all concerning "the
same issue";11 while the remaining case approves the last mentioned
12
phrase.
While the correctness of these decisions is not to be questioned, at
least from the point of view of any injustice to the individual, it should
be observed that the qualifying words mentioned could lead to a position
which might unfairly impinge upon the liberty of the individual. This
follows for the result of such language would point to an opposite rule
which would, if the interrogator was able to present a line of questioning
that covered more than one subject matter, expose the individual to a
separate punishment for contempt for every refusal which covered a
different issue. 13 To such a rule, some practical objections could be entertained. In the first place, there would be no certainty as to the maximum
punishment to which an individual would be subject, for the judge, at the
time for determining the extent of the punishment, would have to search
the record and make distinctions, difficult to make objectively, as to when
one line of questioning had been abandoned and a new line taken up.
Secondly, if the punishment is to be invoked because of the objectionable
attitude displayed by the individual, what difference should it make
whether his refusals pertain to one or to different subject matters? In the
end, he has only one and the same contumacious attitude justifying but
14
one punishment for contempt.
There is still another objection to such a rule, but one less likely to
arise over an investigation conducted by a court or a grand jury, where
specific issues may be the more readily formulated, than is true with
respect to inquisitorial proceedings conducted by legislative committees
where there is opportunity to embark upon a line of questioning covering
10 This phrase, as used in United States v. Yukio Abe, 95 F. Supp. 991 at 992
(1950), again concerned questions as to membership in the Communist Party. The
proceeding was based on 2 U. S. C. A. § 192, each refusal being set out in a separate
count. On motion to dismiss, the court held that it was proper to put each refusal
in a separate count but, as the refusals concerned one subject of inquiry, proper
punishment was said to be limited to that for one contumacious refusal.
11 Maxwell v. Rives, 11 Nev. 213 at 217 (1876). Hawley, C. J., in a concurring
opinion, characterized the fact that all the questions were designed to ascertain
what the witness had done with certain silver bullion.
12 In United States v. Emspak, 95 P. Supp. 1012 (1951), a proceeding similar to
the one cited in footnote 10, the court recognized that inasmuch as all the questions
were designed to ascertain whether the witness was a member of the Communist
Party they necessarily concerned the same issue.
13 It would theoretically be possible for an ambitious interrogator, by a suitable
variation of his questions, to produce a result under which the contemptuous witness might be imprisoned for the balance of his life, particularly if the sentences
were made to run consecutively.
14 State ex rel. Parker v. Mouser, 208 La. 1093, 24 So. (2d) 151 (1945). O'Niell,
C. J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
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a multitude of subject matters. A basic fear of all forms of inquisitions
has produced a pattern of constitutional protection designed to cloak the
individual with certain rights which have operated to produce a fence
around the scope of these inquisitorial proceedings. 15 The implications
suggested by the rule laid down in the instant case might well operate to
whittle away at that protection.
With this in mind, it may be noted that three of the recent cases
mentioned had to do with the asking of a series of questions designed to
elicit the fact as to whether or not the witness was a member of the
Communist Party. 16 Apparently, under the impetus of such investigations,
sight is being lost of the objectives of a democratic form of government.
If the rule laid down in these cases is observed, a position will be attained
consistent with a fundamental desire to preserve that carefully guarded
balance which, at a minimum, puts the witness on an equal footing with
the questioner. If this balance be upset, as the intimations indicate it
might be, the result would be to place an additional weapon at the disposition of the inquisitor. That weapon, taking the form of a lever of
coercion based on a threat of the possibility of being asked numerous
questions covering many issues with a consequence of not one but many
punishments for refusal to answer, might well intimidate all but the
staunchest of witnesses. 17 Such a result would hardly conform to long
recognized and fundamental concepts of government under a free society.
While the correctness of the result of the principal case is not challenged, it would seem that the inherent reasoning thereof is poor. Truer
reason for the result would appear to lie in the fact that the refusal to
answer one or many, related or unrelated, questions asked at one proceeding should warrant punishment for but a single contempt because of the
singleness of the attitude displayed rather than because of any similarity
in the line of interrogation.
D. R. HANSON
15 U. S. Const., Amend. V, states that no person "shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself." It reflects the reality of a fear on
the part of its framers and supporters against the former inquisitorial nature of
British criminal proceedings. The protection thereof, of course, is not limited to
judicial matters.
16 United States v. Emspak, 95 F. Supp. 1012 (1951) ; United States v. Yukio Abe,
95 F. Supp. 991 (1950) ; Fawick Airflex Co. v. United Electrical, R. & M. Wkrs.,
87 Ohio App. 371, 92 N. E. (2d) 431 (1950).
17 While it is admitted that a witness has a right to refuse to answer those
questions which might tend to incriminate him, it must be recognized that he may
wish to refuse to answer other questions because his answers might do injury to
his reputation or to his financial position. If a refusal to answer the significant
question is apt to expose him to lines of further questioning as to other matters, he
may yield to the pressure so generated to avoid the dilemma of chosing between
self-disgrace or self-injury on the one hand and the overly-weighted penalty of
punishment for a series of contempts on the other.
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Liberty Mutual Insurance Com-

pany v. Vallendingham' discloses an interesting interpretation which has

been given to Section 905 of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act. 2 It appeared therein that an employee of an employer
who was subject to the Act had been injured in the course of his employment and had elected to accept the compensation benefits there provided.
Plaintiff, insurance carrier for the employer, by appropriate subrogation
proceedings under the Act, 3 brought suit against certain defendants charging that their negligence had contributed to the employee's injury. These
4
defendants thereupon impleaded the employer as a third-party defendant,
claiming that the employer's contributory negligence was a proximate
concurring cause of the employee's injury and seeking contribution from
the employer. 5 The plaintiff moved to dismiss the third-party complaint
and that motion was granted on the ground that Section 905 of the Act
released the employer from liability to "anyone otherwise entitled to
recover damages from such employer"

on account of an injury or death,

for which reason it was not possible to hold the employer to contribution
based on the contention that the employer was a joint tort feasor. In that
fashion, the court guaranteed to the employer the protection which had
been sought by transferring the risk to an insurer.
The question raised in the principal case has to do with the right of
contribution from an employer who has made provision for the payment
of compensation benefits under the Act, but an identical problem could
well arise where the third party seeks indemnification from an employer
1 94 F. Supp. 17 (1950). The case arose in the District of Columbia which has
adopted the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act as the general
workmen's compensation act for the District: D. C. Code 1940, § 36-501.
2 33 U. S. C. A. § 901 et seq. Section 905 provides, in part, that the liability "of
an employer prescribed in Section 904 of this title shall be exclusive and in place
of all other liability of such employer to the employee, his legal representative,
husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to
recover damages from such employer at law or in admiralty on account of such
injury or death." Italics added.

3 Ibid., § 933(b), provides that acceptance of compensation shall operate as an
assignment to the employer of all right of the person entitled to compensation to
recover damages against a third person. Section 933(i) directs that if an employer
is insured and the insurance carrier has assumed the payment of compensation, the
insurance carrier is to be subrogated to all the rights of the employer under this
section. See also The Etna, 138 F. (2d) 37 (1943).
4 Third-party practice is authorized by Fed. Rules Civ. Prac., Rule 14.
5 The District of Columbia, contrary to common law principles, recognizes a right
of contribution between joint tort feasors.
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subject to the Act. While many of the reported cases draw no distinction
between the two situations, they will be treated separately in this discussion
for reasons to be indicated later.
The instant case, adopting a practical view to prevent defeat of the
purpose of the statute, states that no right of contribution exists in such
cases. But this has not always appeared to be so for the progress of
reasoning has been an uphill one largely because of dicta appearing in
certain admiralty cases where the question of contribution or indemnity
was not squarely before the court.6 Those cases have tended to indicate,
in a general way, that a right to contribution or indemnity from an
employer who is subject to the Act exists because admiralty law, unlike
7
common law, recognizes a right of contribution between joint tort feasors.
Such dicta was followed in the case of The Tarnpico,8 an admiralty case
directly in point with the principal one but one which reached an entirely
contrary holding. The employer there was impleaded in accordance with
certain provisions of admiralty practice9 and judgment was pronounced
against the libellee together with a provision that the libellee might have
contribution from the employer for one-half of the amount of the judgment. It was there stated that the admiralty rule of contribution between
joint tort feasors did not rest on subrogation but arose directly from the
tort, for which reason the immunity given by the Act to the employer
furnished no defense against the libellee's claim to contribution. 10 It should
be noted, however, that the decision was based on an admiralty rule and
that little thought was there given to the practical aspects of the statute
itself. That an employer, bound by the Act to an employer's limited but
inevitable liability, should exchange that limited liability for an unconditional and unlimited one is not within reason. Accordingly, remedies against
6 Cases frequently cited as authority for the proposition that, notwithstanding
Section 905 of the Act, an employer may be liable for contribution or indemnity to
a third party sued by an employee of the employer are Rederii v. Jarka Corp.,
26 F. Supp. 304 (1939), affirmed in 110 F. (2d) 234 (1940) ; Calvino v. Pan-Atlantic
S. S. Corp., 29 F. Supp. 1022 (1939), noted in 168 A. L. R. 612; and Cataldo v. A/S
Glittre, 41 F. Supp. 555 (1941). These cases contain only dicta on the point.
7 See Erie R. Co. v. Erie & W. Transp. Co., 204 U. S. 220, 27 S. Ct. 246, 51 L. Ed.
450 (1907).
8 45 F. Supp. 174 (1942).
9 28 U. S. C. A., Adm. Rule 56.
10 The view so expressed has been followed in Baccile v. Halcyon Lines, 89 F.
Supp. 765 (1950); Portal v. United States, 85 F. Supp. 458 (1949); The S. S.
Samovar, 72 F. Supp. 574 (1947), citing dicta in the Rederii and Cataldo cases; and
Christon v. United States, 8 F. R. D. 327 (1947), which cited American Stevedores
v. Porello, 330 U. S. 446, 67 S. Ct. 847, 91 L. Ed. 1011 (1947). That case was
decided on the basis of contractual indemnity. Upon remand, in Porello v. United
States, 94 F. Supp. 952 (1950), the validity of the contract requiring indemnity
from the employer to the United States was upheld.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

the employer under circumstances of the type involved in the principal
case should be strictly limited."
The practical view suggested finally prevailed in the case of Johnson
v. United States,12 also an admiralty case, wherein the exclusiveness of
remedy against the employer was first treated with the thought in mind
that to hold an employer for contribution would be contrary to the
manifest purpose of the Act. The court there indicated that to hold that
an employer, bound by a compulsory compensation act, could be sued
indirectly, as was there proposed, would be "like opening a hole in a
dike, '"1 s and would destroy the basic principle of compensation. The
doctrine of that case now seems firmly imbedded in the law and the logic
thereof would be hard to attack. The Act, by preventing recovery by an
employee against his employer on the ground of the employer's negligence,
operates to make the statutory obligation of the employer to pay compensation into an exclusive one. If the statute was to be construed to preserve
the employer's liability for the payment of a sum measured, in whole or
in part, by the damages sustained by the employee, merely because the
negligence of a third party concurred, or was claimed to have concurred,
with his own in producing the injury, the employer's liability would then
be lacking in exclusiveness. For that reason, it was said, in the case of
Standard Wholesale Phosphate & Acid Works, Inc. v. Rukert Terminals
Corporation,14 that it was immaterial whether his liability to a joint tort
feasor stemmed from "a statutory right to contribution or from general
principles of the admiralty law."' 5 It is clear, then, that where an employer
is subject to the terms of the Act there is no common liability between
him and a third party, for the former responds by paying compensation,
often without regard to fault, while the other is muleted in damages based
only on fault. 16
In holding to this practical view, the instant case speaks of "proximate
concurring cause" and "joint tort feasors" as if the right invaded or the
duty owed was common to both employer and third person. It does not
deal with a possible right to indemnity which a third party may have
against an employer where the employer's negligence is alleged to be the
sole and proximate cause of the injuries or where it is alleged that a right
to indemnity exists because of an independent duty owed by the employer
to the third party. A typical case which might give rise to a claim for
11 See a discussion of this view in a concurring opinion by Justice Learned Hand
in American Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 182 F. (2d) 322 (1950).
12 79 F. Supp. 448 (1948).
13 79 F. Supp. 448 at 449.
14 - Md. -, 65 A. (2d) 304 (1949).
15- Md. - at -, 65 A. (2d) 304 at 308.
16 American Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 182 F. (2d) 322 (1950).
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indemnity would be one where a longshoreman firm contracts with a
shipowner to load a vessel or to do some maintenance work thereon. After
the injured longshoreman, having elected to proceed against the third
person, has recovered from the shipowner, the latter may look for indemnity
from the injured employee's primary employer. In some instances, the
contract between the firm and the shipowner may expressly provide for a
right of indemnity. If so, it has been said to be axiomatic that the exclusive
character of the worker's remedy against his primary employer would
7
afford no protection to one who has seen fit to waive the protection.'
In other cases, however, the contract may be silent on. the point and a
question would then be generated closely analogous to the one found in
the instant case.
There is no clear cut decision which holds that no right of indemnity
from an employer exists where the third party has been sued directly and
the contract is silent, but there might seem to be every reason to expect
an opposite holding. Such a right to indemnity might be said to arise from
the breach of an independent duty owed by the employer to the third
party as, for example, a duty to do the work contracted for in a proper
manner. There. is, therefore, strong authority that the breach of such an
independent duty will afford the third party with a remedy, as by way
of indemnification, against the employer notwithstanding the exclusiveness of the Act as it relates to claims by employees against employers. s
A manifest difference does exist, however, between suits for contribution
and suits for indemnity in that the latter rest on an expressed or implied
agreement or obligation to respond for all the damages, whereas, under
the former, a common burden is to be shared by persons who stand in
equali juri.19 That factor alone may serve as justification for the diversity
in the holdings.
Looking to the remedy sought, however, the conclusion is inescapable
that if a third party is entitled to seek indemnity from an employer
because of some breach of duty resting in negligence, the employer is then
being asked to respond in damages in an indirect way for something for
17 American Stevedores v. Porello, 330 U. S. 446, 67 S. Ct. 847, 91 L. Ed. 1011
See also
(1947), followed in Porello v. United States, 94 F. Supp. 952 (1950).
Lyons v. American-Hawaiian S. S. Co., 89 F. Supp. 334 (1950) ; Severn v. United
States, 69 F. Supp. 21 (1946) ; Benevento v. United States, 68 P. Supp. 347 (1946),
affirmed on other grounds In 160 F. (2d) 487 (1947) ; Green v. War Shipping Administration, 66 F. Supp. 393 (1946).
Is Rich v. United States, 177 F. (2d) 688 (1949), citing with approval from
Westchester Lighting Co. v. Westchester County Small Estates Corp., 278 N. Y. 175,
15 N. E. (2d) 567 (1938) ; Burris v. American Chicle Co., 120 F. (2d) 218 (1941).
New York cases are frequently cited by the federal courts on this problem in
recognition of the fact that the federal statute is modelled on the New York
Workmen's Compensation Law: Coates v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 95 F. Supp.
779 (1951).
19 Barbara v. Stephen Ransom, Inc., 191 Misc. 957, 79 N. Y. S. (2d) 438 (1948).
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which he could not be held to make direct response. If, by an impleading
petition, 20 the third party is entitled to seek indemnity from the employer
in the event he should be found liable to the injured employee, no practical
reason would seem to exist for barring direct suit by employee against
employer. As it is now clear that if the injury complained of is the sole
fault of the employer the only available remedy to the employee is under
the Act itself, 21 reasoning of this nature brings the ends of the arc of
contribution and indemnity together at a point where direct opposition
rather than harmony results. If resolution of that conflict is to be produced, it would seem as if the only way out would be the universal
adoption of one view or the other. The instant holding, with its emphasis
on the exclusive character of the employer's liability, may well become
the starting point for a re-examination of the entire problem.
T. L.

20 Of necessity, the attempt would have to be made in a court
practice prevails. As to whether such is possible in a state court
see 28 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIEW 33 and 29 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
21 Frusteri v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 667 (1947) ; Armento
74 F. Supp. 198 (1947) ; Paolillo v. Redari A/B Disa, 38 F. Supp.
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